Lessons learned from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico: Practical measures to mitigate the impact of a catastrophic natural disaster on radiation oncology patients by Gay, Hiram A et al.
Washington University School of Medicine 
Digital Commons@Becker 
Open Access Publications 
9-1-2019 
Lessons learned from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico: Practical 
measures to mitigate the impact of a catastrophic natural 
disaster on radiation oncology patients 
Hiram A Gay 
Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis 
James A Kavanaugh 
Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis 
Jeff Bradley 
Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis 
et al 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/open_access_pubs 
Recommended Citation 
Gay, Hiram A; Kavanaugh, James A; Bradley, Jeff; and et al, ,"Lessons learned from Hurricane Maria in 
Puerto Rico: Practical measures to mitigate the impact of a catastrophic natural disaster on radiation 
oncology patients." Practical Radiation Oncology.,. . (2019). 
https://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/open_access_pubs/9236 
This Open Access Publication is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons@Becker. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Open Access Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Becker. 
For more information, please contact engeszer@wustl.edu. 
Special Article
Lessons Learned From Hurricane Maria in Puerto
Rico: Practical Measures to Mitigate the Impact
of a Catastrophic Natural Disaster on Radiation
Oncology Patients
Hiram A. Gay MD a,*, Roberto Santiago MD b, Betty Gil MD c, Carlos Remedios MD d,
Pedro J. MontesMS, DABR e, Javier López-AraujoMD, DABR b, CarlosM. ChévereMD f,
Winston S. Imbert MD g, Julia White MD h, Douglas W. Arthur MD i,
Janet K. Horton MD, MHS j, Reshma Jagsi MD, DPhil k, Rachel Rabinovich MD l,
Sushil Beriwal MD, MBA m, Akila Viswanathan MD, MPH, MSc n,
Beth A. Erickson MD, FACR, FASTRO, FABS o, Ramesh Rengan MD, PhD p,
David Palma MD q, Billy W. Loo Jr, MD, PhD r, James A. Kavanaugh MS a,
Jeff Bradley MD a, Sue S. Yom MD, PhD, MAS s, Paul M. Harari MD t,
Omer Lee Burnett III, MD, FAWM u
aDepartment of Radiation Oncology, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, Missouri; bPrecise Radiation
Oncology Center, Bayamon, Puerto Rico; cRadiation Therapy and Cancer Institute, San Juan, Puerto Rico; dInstituto de
Radioterapia del Este, Humacao, Puerto Rico; eNorthern Radiotherapy Cancer Center, Arecibo, Puerto Rico; fCentro
Comprensivo de Cáncer de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico; gTomé and Ubiñas Radio Oncology
Center, San Juan, Puerto Rico; hDepartment of Radiation Oncology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio;
iDepartment of Radiation Oncology, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia; jDepartment of Radiation
Oncology, Duke University Medical Center, Durham, North Carolina; kDepartment of Radiation Oncology, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan; lDepartment of Radiation Oncology, University of Colorado School of Medicine,
Aurora, Colorado; mUPMC Hillman Cancer Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; nJohns Hopkins Radiation Oncology and
Molecular Radiation Sciences, Baltimore, Maryland; oDepartment of Radiation Oncology, Medical College of Wisconsin,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; pDepartment of Radiation Oncology, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington; qLondon
Regional Cancer Program, London, Ontario, Canada; rDepartment of Radiation Oncology & Stanford Cancer Institute,
Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California; sDepartment of Radiation Oncology, University of
California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California; tDepartment of Human Oncology, Carbone Cancer Center,
University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Madison, Wisconsin; and uDepartment of Radiation
Oncology, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama
Received 4 December 2018; revised 24 January 2019; accepted 13 March 2019
Sources of support: This work had no specific funding.
Disclosures: The authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose.
* Corresponding author. Department of Radiation Oncology, Washington University School of Medicine, 4921 Parkview Place, Campus Box 8224, St.
Louis, MO 63110.
E-mail address: hiramgay@wustl.edu (H.A. Gay).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prro.2019.03.007
1879-8500/ 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of American Society for Radiation Oncology. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Practical Radiation Oncology (2019) 9, 305-321
www.practicalradonc.org
Abstract
Purpose: Although the wind, rain, and flooding of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico abated shortly
after its landfall on September 20, 2017, the disruption of the electrical, communications, trans-
portation, and medical infrastructure of the island was unprecedented in scope and caused lasting
harm for many months afterward. A compilation of recommendations from radiation oncologists
who were in Puerto Rico during the disaster, and from a panel of American Society for Radiation
Oncology (ASTRO) cancer experts was created.
Methods and materials: Radiation oncologists throughout Puerto Rico collaborated and impro-
vised to continue treating patients in the immediate aftermath of the storm and as routine clinical
operations were restored gradually. Empirical lessons from the experience of radiation therapy
administration in this profoundly altered context of limited resources, impaired communication,
and inadequate transportation were organized into a recommended template, applicable to any
radiation oncology practice. ASTRO disease-site experts provided evidence-guidelines for miti-
gating the impact of a 2- to 3-week interruption in radiation therapy.
Results: Practical measures to mitigate the medical impact of a disaster are summarized within the
framework of “Prepare, Communicate, Operate, Compensate.” Specific measures include the
development of an emergency operations plan tailored to specific circumstances, prospective co-
ordination with other radiation oncology clinics before a disaster, ongoing communications with
emergency management organizations, and routine practice of alternate methods to disseminate
information among providers and patients.
Conclusions: These recommendations serve as a starting point to assist any radiation oncology
practice in becoming more resiliently prepared for a local or regional disruption from any cause.
Disease-site experts provide evidence-based guidelines on how to mitigate the impact of a 2- to 3-
week interruption in radiation therapy for lung, head and neck, uterine cervix, breast, and prostate
cancers through altered fractionation or dose escalation.
 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of American Society for Radiation
Oncology. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
Hurricane Maria was a catastrophe that affected mul-
tiple layers of the complex, interdependent, and modern
infrastructure on which we have become dependent, both
in Puerto Rico and on the U.S. mainland. In addition to
being an island in the Caribbean Sea, Puerto Rico was
particularly vulnerable to systems disruption and delayed
reconstruction because of its preceding 11 years of eco-
nomic recession, a concurrent population exodus of
nearly half a million people over the past decade to the
U.S. mainland1 in search of jobs and more affordable cost
of living, and a $72 billion public debt.2 Even as the
reconstruction of Puerto Rico’s utility infrastructure
continues, the lessons learned during the past months
invite reflection and demand preparation for all those who
care for the most frail and vulnerable among usdthose
who are ill.
Although a near-total disruption of services such as
occurred in Puerto Rico is unlikely in the U.S. mainland, a
similar degree of cascading local or regional dysfunction is
indeed possible consequent to earthquakes, hurricanes,
tornados, wildfires, tsunami, flooding, cyberattacks,
terrorism, nuclear war, and other calamities that can disrupt
the electric power grid, water supply, transportation, and
distribution networks of food, medicine, and other critical
supplies. The experiences with Hurricane Maria in Puerto
Rico in 2017, Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005,
and Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992 provide lessons
that can inform preparations and increase resiliency when
facing the most probable risks in any locale.
Two weeks before Maria struck, category 5 Hurricane
Irma skirted the coast of Puerto Rico on September 6,
2017 and left >1 million people without power. It caused
proportionately more damage in the Virgin Islands.3 The
HIMA Health Group Radiation Oncology clinic in Puerto
Rico received 22 patients from the U.S. Virgin Islands
who were affected by Hurricane Irma.
Just days after Hurricane Irma, Hurricane Maria made
landfall in Puerto Rico on the morning of September 20,
2017 as a category 4 hurricane, with sustained winds of
155 mph, just 2 mph below the threshold for being
designated a category 5 storm. Based on the observed
wind impacts, approximately half of the island experi-
enced peak gusts between 96 and 129 mph, and except for
the southwest corner of the island, the other half experi-
enced peak gusts between 74 and 95 mph (Fig 1).4 In
addition to wind damage, heavy rains and flash floods
exacerbated the widespread devastation (Fig 2).5 In a 48-
hour period, from September 19 to 21, 2017, some areas
in Puerto Rico received as much as 35 to 40 inches of
rain, with most of the island receiving >10 inches of
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rain.6 Landslides were extensive and severely compro-
mised transportation in the weeks to come; it is estimated
that landslides occurred at a rate of fewer than 25 land-
slides per square kilometer across half the island’s area
and at a rate of more than 25 per square kilometer in 5%
of the landmass (Fig 3).7
After Hurricane Maria, 100% of Puerto Rico was
without power.5 As of March 2018, 16% of Puerto Ricans
still lacked electricity, making this the longest blackout in
U.S. history.5,8 Furthermore, some residents still are
without access to plumbed water or need to boil municipal
water before drinking because of contamination and water
advisories. As of December 2017, 60,000 houses were
roofless. Overall, an estimated $94 billion in damages was
incurred.
Even more devastating than the catastrophic property
damage was the loss of life directly related to the hurri-
cane (eg, drowning, flying debris, building collapse, and
electrocution) or the ensuing unsafe conditions that
contributed to injury, illness, or unavailability of ser-
vices.9 Although the official death toll was officially re-
ported by government authorities as 64, difficulties in
communication, major population movements off of the
island, and disruptions in routine services, including
government records, medical death certificates, and mor-
tuary services, may have contributed to a substantial un-
derestimate of the true mortality as a result of Hurricane
Maria.
Several independent analyses have suggested that the
true number of deaths could be in excess of 1000. A
Harvard-led team conducted an extensive survey of 3299
households throughout Puerto Rico and produced an all-
cause mortality estimate of 14.3 deaths per 1000 between
September 20, 2017 and December 31, 2017. This value
was 62% higher than the well-documented rate from the
corresponding period in 2016, suggesting that the true
number of excess deaths from hurricane-related debris,
drowning, illness, injury, or lack of access to medical
facilities was 4645 (>70 times the official value of 64).10
Because “interruption of medical care was the primary
cause of sustained high mortality in the months after the
hurricane,” the authors noted that closing their analyzed
period in December may have led them to underestimate
the total impact of the previously severe but still ongoing
difficulties patients face in accessing medicine, physi-
cians, and advanced life-sustaining treatments, such as
Figure 1 Hurricane MariadExposure based on observed wind impacts.4
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hemodialysis and pulmonary support. “Chronically ill
patients are particularly vulnerable to disruptions in basic
utilities, which highlights the need for these patients, their
communities, and their providers to have contingency
plans during and after disasters.”10
The impact of a major catastrophe, such as Hurricane
Maria, on a radiation oncology (RO) practice and, most
importantly, its patients, cannot be overstated (Fig 4).
Because of the daily nature of radiation therapy (RT)
treatments, any significant gap in treatment may affect
patients’ locoregional control and survival. The goal of an
RO practice responding to a catastrophe should be to
restart patient treatments as soon as possible. Mitigating
the devastating impact on patients requires 4 key ele-
ments: rigorously preparing before the catastrophe,
establishing effective channels of communication with
patients before and after the disaster, rendering the RO
facility operational as soon as possible, and compensating
for treatment gaps (prepare, communicate, operate,
compensate [PCOC]).
The damage done by Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico
and the subsequent harm to RO patients could not be
avoided, but the disaster does provide an opportunity to
increase the preparation and resiliency of our own
practices. Most U.S. RO practices are unlikely to expe-
rience a hurricane, and total failure of the electrical grid is
less likely on the mainland, but many mishaps could
impair the smooth functioning of our infrastructure on a
local or regional level to a similar degree. The critical
challenges faced by RO facilities in Puerto Rico fell into
the following broad categories: power, communication,
and patient access to facilities. In addition to previous
challenges, both patients and staff faced the following
critical challenges: water, food, transportation, and shel-
ter. By increasing awareness of our vulnerabilities and
making sensible preparations that are appropriate to our
disparate circumstances, we can ameliorate the effects of
stochastic disasters for the benefit of our patients, our
practices, and ourselves.
This paper draws upon the experience of radiation
oncologists attempting to care for patients in the aftermath
of Hurricane Maria and proposes some initial steps,
therapeutic approaches, and minimal guidelines to address
the shortcomings and needs that proved most urgent in the
first weeks of recovery. In essence, this is a list of what we
wish we had done beforehand and what we needed most
afterward. The authors include Puerto Rican radiation
oncologists and disease-site experts, all of whom hope
Figure 2 Hurricane Maria estimated rainfall.6 (A color version of this figure is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prro.2019.03.007).
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that this document can serve as a first step toward
establishing more structured preparations for disaster,
tailored to the circumstances of all our practices as we
attempt to serve our patients.
Prepare: Step 1 of PCOC
The preparation phase is critical in minimizing the
treatment delays that may result from a natural disaster.
Table 1 describes the consensus preparation checklist
from radiation oncologists in Puerto Rico and can be
adapted for other disasters and locations. Many books and
online resources on emergency preparedness are avail-
able, including www.ready.gov, which has a section on
hurricane preparedness. Of note, the recommended min-
imum 3 days of supplies would have been vastly insuf-
ficient given the breadth of disruption in Puerto Rico. We
will focus on the emergency preparedness of an RO fa-
cility for a disaster similar to Hurricane Maria. Having the
most accurate information available on the hurricane
before landfall is essential. Accurate hurricane forecasting
is very important. The hurricane forecast maps provided
by the National Hurricane Center may be useful to depict
the general path, timeline, and strength of the hurricane.
Some prefer the European Center for Medium-Range
Weather Forecasting model,11 which can be viewed at
www.windy.com or the Windy app for iOS or Android.
The Emergency Operations Coordinator (EOC) would
be expected to serve as the primary point of contact with
emergency management personnel, with whom contact
should be made beforehand, and would facilitate
communication between RO facilities and patients. It is
highly recommended that the EOC obtain free online
training through the U.S. Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute
in the Incident Command System and Community
Emergency Response Team (available at https://training.
fema.gov/emi.aspx). The EOC need not be a physician
or other medical provider, but the office does require
intimate knowledge of the clinic’s medical operations,
material needs, and local resources.
Multiple clinics relying on centralized servers to treat
patients may be vulnerable if linear accelerators cannot
communicate with the server. Given the technologic so-
phistication of RO, this need is quite acute. Patients
should be given USB flash drive copies of their medical
records and Digital Imaging and Communications in
Figure 3 Concentration of landslides caused by Hurricane Maria.7
Practical Radiation Oncology: September-October 2019 Mitigating disasters in radiation oncology 309
Medicine data sets as described in Table 1. Flash drives
are portable and robust and allow patients to optimally
resume care at another local facility or abroad. Most, if
not all, patients who resume treatment at another facility
will benefit from a resimulation because positioning sys-
tems or treatment equipment may be different, the tumor
may have changed in size during the treatment break, and
the patient may have lost weight. The most recent cone
beam computed tomography (CT) scan can be helpful in
assessing changes between the last treatment and the new
simulation. Fusing the original structure set with the new
planning CT will expedite the contouring process and
maintain consistency with the original intended volumes.
In the ideal scenario where the gross tumor volumes
(GTVs) have not changed much and are covered well by
the original planning target volume (PTV), the PTV is
cleaned from fusion artifacts and the skin minus a 3 mm
contour is subtracted from the PTV, as in the case of a
head and neck intensity modulated RT (IMRT) plan.
Substantial changes in the GTV will require a new GTV,
clinical target volume, and PTV. Organ-at-risk contours
can be inspected and edited as necessary to reflect
changes in anatomy or patient positioning.
Access to alternative power is critical to prepare for a
natural disaster. Although all but 2 RO facilities in Puerto
Rico technically had access to power from diesel gener-
ators, the subsequent ability to obtain and store fuel was
very limited. Furthermore, even when a hospital had
functioning generators, RO was in some instances not
considered a priority to receive power, especially if the
RO clinic building was separate from the main hospital.
Partly this was an effort to conserve fuel because RO
clinics are power hungry, and intensive care and emer-
gency units were also in need of power. Nevertheless, this
raises ethical questions as to how best allocate resources.
Contingency plans with hospital administration should be
discussed beforehand.
Communicate: Step 2 of PCOC
The communication phase (Table 2) implements the
communication plan created in the preparation phase
(Table 1). Communication with patients efficiently
through any available means will help minimize treatment
delays.
Data submitted by communication providers in Puerto
Rico to the Federal Communications Commission’s
Disaster Information Reporting System showed that
90.3% of cell sites were out of service 8 days after
Figure 4 Representative photos of damage from Hurricane Maria (A-C).24 Of the 1600 cellular antenna towers in Puerto Rico, only
15% to 20% continued to operate after Hurricane Maria (D). Photo: Archivo/GFR Media.25
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Table 1 Prepare: Step 1 of PCOC
Prepare Checklist
Category Item Description
Organization EOP Each clinic should have a designated EOC with the responsibility of guiding the
preparation of an EOP appropriate to its specific circumstances and
communicating it to all employees.
Practice The EOC should organize opportunities to practice implementation of the EOP,
including use of alternative modes of communication with patients and staff,
coordination with other medical facilities, and use of alternative power and water
sources.
Communication Inform patients of EOP Establish and routinely inform patients in writing of RO clinic’s disaster
management plan.
RO clinic coordination The EOC should share the EOP among regional RO centers to facilitate
collaboration among centers in a disaster. Identify and appoint a central entity to
represent all RO clinics.
EOC The EOC should maintain contact with local, commonwealth, and federal
governmental emergency management agencies and provide them with a current
copy of the EOP to expedite communications in time of need. The EOC is
responsible for ensuring all contacts remain up to date.
Staff phone list for patients
and staff
The list should be printed and laminated to be waterproof. The list should contain
as many communication methods as possible per staff: satellite phone, landline,
cellular phone, and 1 internet option for all (eg, Skype, WhatsApp, Facebook
Messenger, Zello). For patients, a subset of this list includes various staff
selected to coordinate patient efforts. Ideally, the staffs’ homes should not be
clustered in the same area, but rather spread out to maximize the chance of
successful communication. For those who live on an island or in an isolated
region, the list should include a designated coordinator abroad with various
methods of communication, and patients should share the list with relatives
living abroad. A link to a social media page (eg, Facebook) should be provided
where the RO clinic’s status report and important messages can be posted to
serve as a bulletin board.
Patient phone list A secure and up-to-date master patient list should be printed and laminated or kept
in a waterproof container. Each patient should provide multiple methods of
contact as well as contact information for friends or family who may be able to
reach them. Patients who consider staying with a relative or going to a shelter
should provide the contact and address information in advance.
Radio and newspapers Identification of local radio station and newspaper contacts for public service
announcements should be done in advance by the EOC. Messages should be pre-
recorded or written and ready to be deployed (eg, clinic X is now open and urges
patients to resume treatment). RO clinics and hospitals should consider providing
staff with emergency communications training and equipment that would permit
similar communication with neighboring hospitals and emergency management
personnel directly without any dependence on grid power or other utilities.
Main clinic phone number Internet telephone systems may be particularly vulnerable to communication
infrastructure failure. A backup landline phone number should be considered
because these may become operational first. Automated voicemail messages with
instructions for patients should be recorded in advance.
Internet presence Radiation oncologists should update their contact information with multiple contact
methods in the American Society for Radiation Oncology directory. RO practice
location and contact information should be updated or created in Google,
Facebook, and/or online phone directories. Hospital or individual practice
webpages should be updated with contact information.
Satellite phone At least 1 activated satellite phone should be available for each RO clinic. These
phone numbers should be shared among RO clinics to coordinate efforts.
Nonpower, grid-dependent
phone charging method
The ability to charge cell phones through a solar, mechanical, or other system for
both patients and staff is invaluable once the power grid fails. These methods
must be practiced routinely, both to confirm their adequacy and gain the
familiarity and competency necessary to employ them during a stressful crisis.
(continued on next page)
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Patients are given a waterproof USB flash drive (2 GB should suffice for most
patients) with the following Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine
files: planning CT, last cone beam CT if available, treatment plan, structure set,
and dose. PDF copies of the treatment plan, radiation therapy treatment record,
simulation setup photos and notes, and relevant medical records (eg, consultation
notes, pathology reports, imaging reports, concurrent therapies [chemotherapy,
immunotherapy], and laboratory results). The RO clinic should also keep a copy
of these patient files in a larger-capacity, waterproof, ideally encrypted, USB
drive. Paper copies stored at the RO clinic in a waterproof, locked container may
be useful as a secondary backup for prolonged power outages without access to
alternate power sources to charge a laptop, for example.
Internet service providers that use digital subscriber lines, cable, or fiber optic
lines are vulnerable to ground infrastructure damage. Satellite Internet may be




Linear accelerator cooling If the linear accelerator depends on a continuous supply of water, an alternative
should be engineered in advance in the event potable water is lacking.
Water A cistern or alternative should be considered to supply potable water to patients
and bathrooms. If the building is multistory, a way to pump water to patient areas
that is not dependent on the power grid should be considered. Methods for
chemical or filtration purification should be available and practiced.
Surge protection Computers, linear accelerators, CT simulator, and other sensitive electronic
equipment should be robustly protected from power surges.
Flood protection A solution should be engineered to protect against flooding in case of a power
failure.
Water infiltration protection Equipment vents to the outside of the facility should be protected from water
infiltration from strong winds. The roof should be well sealed to minimize the
risk of water leaks, especially if constructed of concrete.
Clinic supplies Necessary supplies should be stored to provide radiation therapy services for a
month.
Diesel generator The clinic should have a diesel generator of sufficient capacity and adequate duty
cycle for weeks without electricity. The generator should be regularly maintained
and tested. Maintenance supplies for at least 1 month should be available (eg, oil,
filters), as well as onsite operators capable of providing routine service.
Generator maintenance alternatives and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and/or government agency contact(s) for diesel delivery in emergencies
should be previously identified. A master list of RO facilities that may need
diesel should be supplied to relevant agencies.
Fuel storage A diesel storage tank with a 2-week supply should be available. Consider a private
security guard, reinforced chains and locks, and a diesel tank security
encasement in areas vulnerable to theft.
Fuel delivery Multiple diesel and/or gasoline delivery alternatives should be identified and/or
contracts made in advance to avoid price hikes.
Patient Care
Continuity
Contingency plan Establish contingency plans with various health care plans, suppliers, contractors,
hospitals, government, medical and surgical oncologists, and cancer charities
(eg, ACS).
Alternative RO clinics RO clinics that are isolated and not part of a group are particularly vulnerable if
they are unable to treat patients. In advance, the closest competing clinics should
be identified and contracts established as feasible to ensure patients have a
convenient RO clinic alternative. Patients should be notified in advance of these
arrangements, and it is paramount that competitors not exploit this to their
advantage but rather consider the wellbeing of all patients. Satellite RO clinics
that are part of a larger group are also vulnerable because they are often located
in remote parts of the island, possibly with less robust infrastructure, and often
depend on remote server connections with the main RO center. When setting up
(continued on next page)
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Maria’s landfall. A large percentage of consumers lacked
cable or wireline services because of a lack of commercial
power or out-of-service switches. Of the 3 TV and 31
radio stations that reported to the Disaster Information
Reporting System, 2 and 9 were down, respectively.12
Communication facilities that were not initially
destroyed ultimately failed as their backup generator
diesel stores were depleted.
For friends and family abroad, lack of communication
with loved ones can be traumatic. In the aftermath of
Hurricane Maria, news outlets were inefficient in
providing timely and detailed status reports, and most
reporting focused on the metro San Juan area. A number
of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
river gauges were operational after Maria and accessible
online, giving a vague picture of some flooded areas.
Social media became extremely important for communi-
cating current conditions. For example, initial reports
from the municipality of Mayagüez were made by a cit-
izen in Florida who had a contact in the Mayagüez Civil
Defense in Puerto Rico. She created a group in the Zello
smartphone app, which operates like a walkie-talkie over
the Internet, and shared her information with those in the
U.S. mainland. In some municipalities, such as
Mayagüez, some landline-based phone numbers resumed
operation before cell phones. Weeks later, with spotty
Internet access, some posted news and photos in several
Facebook groups, such as Huracán María Puerto Rico or
Puerto Rico Informa. A handful of radio stations in Puerto
Rico were also accessible through the Internet.
The importance of commercial broadcast radio as a
method of communication after a catastrophe has
destroyed communications infrastructure cannot be un-
derstated. Initially, radio stations were more useful to the
public because more radio stations were operational than
TV stations, and personal radios can run on batteries or
other methods without the need for electricity. Amateur
radio operators provided essential assistance in Puerto
Rico for intra-island communications, as well as to the
mainland, even before the deployment of 25 two-man
teams from the mainland by the American Radio Relay
League in conjunction with the American Red Cross.
Because of the complex nature of daily RT, an RO
practice requires effective communication between the
RO facility staff and patients and between the computer
servers and linear accelerators. The loss of telephone and
Internet service for both RO clinics and patients delayed
efforts to repair the facilities and made communication
Table 1 (continued )
Prepare Checklist
Category Item Description
satellite clinics, it is important to highlight that machines should be beam
matched. This will provide a quick solution for the patient if the main RO center
is able to restart operations first.
Alternative lodging Coordination with a nearby Hope Lodge from the ACS that may be closer to the
RO clinic or securing closer temporary housing may aid patient access to
treatments.
Patient education Proactively educate patients, referring physicians, and other health care providers
about the importance of avoiding treatment interruptions during radiation therapy
and the outcome consequences.
Transportation Gasoline Patients and staff should fill their gasoline vehicle tanks before the hurricane. The
best practice is never to allow one’s tank to become less than half full. For most
people, the danger of storing additional gasoline in containers at home outweighs
the benefits. Check local regulations on the proper handling and storage of
gasoline. Patients with cancer and medical personnel should be given priority
once gasoline is resupplied at gas stations. Providing patient transportation with
buses belonging to the RO clinic, contracts with private transportation agencies,
or volunteers (eg, ACS) should be planned. Transportation providers should
have staff and/or patient lists in advance to coordinate efforts. Patients and staff
should have cash withdrawn to purchase gasoline, food, water, and other
necessities because automated teller machines and credit cards may not function
during a power failure.
Patient evacuation Government agencies should be contacted to plan the transportation of patients
who may be stranded by debris, flooding, landslides, and other impediments to
transportation.
Transportation plan A transportation plan should be already contracted in case of disaster. Patients who
cannot reach treatment centers on their own can be efficiently helped.
Abbreviations: ACS Z American Cancer Society; CT Z computed tomography; EOC Z emergency operations coordinator; EOP Z emergency
operations plan; PCOC Z prepare, communicate, operate, compensate; RO Z radiation oncology.
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with patients to inform them when treatments would
resume impossible. The lack of communication precluded
physician-to-physician discussions of complex cases and
coordination of therapy. Some patients who learned that
their RO clinic was closed presented to a different RO
facility that was open. The new radiation oncologist then
faced the challenge of not knowing the previous dose
delivered, treatment plan, and other vital medical infor-
mation. As conditions improved, patients arrived at RO
clinics with only written treatment and clinical history
summaries.
In the San Juan area, Dr. Carlos Chévere from the
University of Puerto Rico Comprehensive Cancer Center
reached out to 2 TV stations, the written press, and local
radio stations to exhort patients to resume RT treatments.
One obstacle was that local radio stations wanted to
charge for these public service announcements. In
contrast with routine advertising, these attempts to assist
patients in the aftermath of a major catastrophe in which
lives were at stake should not have been monetized by the
radio stations. Some RO clinics ran ads in local news-
papers to inform patients of the RO clinic status.
As communications improved, text messaging became
the most effective way of communication. During com-
mutes to home or work, radiation oncologists would often
stop on the highway emergency lane when a cell phone
signal was available to communicate with referring phy-
sicians. Medical oncologists in the San Juan metro area
relied on WhatsApp for communication. Once home,
communication again became impossible for many radi-
ation oncologists. Eventually, Google’s balloon project
Loon provided Internet connectivity to 100,000 LTE-
capable cell phones.13
Using local radio stations to provide information on
the status of RO clinics, encouraging patients to resume
treatment, and providing contact information can be very
useful. Communicating as quickly as possible is crucial
because diesel generators providing emergency power to
any communication towers and radio stations will even-
tually run out of fuel, and fuel resupply can be inconsis-
tent afterward. Leaving a sign on a closed RO facility is
also useful to provide information to patients, such as
contact information and the anticipated reopening date
and time. Closed facilities should provide provisions for
Table 2 Communicate: Step 2 of PCOC
Communicate Checklist
Item Description
RO clinics coordination The central entity appointed to represent all RO clinics serves as an advocate when dealing with




The RO clinic’s EOC establishes contact with local, commonwealth, and federal governmental
emergency management agencies as necessary, as well as the central entity representing all the RO
clinics. The EOC communicates with emergency medical services (eg, fire and ambulance), utility
services (eg, water, electricity, and telephone), police, organized relief groups (eg, American Red
Cross) as necessary, and, if available, volunteer organizations (eg, search and rescue squads,
Amateur Radio Emergency Service chapters), and churches and schools with facilities for disaster
relief.
Staff phone list for patients
and staff
The communication methods established in Table 1 are activated.
Patient phone list Patients and staff communicate as agreed upon from the suggestions in Table 1. Special HIPAA
provisions apply with regard to sharing patient contact information to authorities in case of
emergency: “health care providers may share patient information with anyone as necessary to
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of a person or the public e
consistent with applicable law (such as state statutes, regulations, or case law) and the provider’s
standards of ethical conduct.” Please refer to the HIPAA Privacy in Emergency Situations Bulletin
for more information.26
Radio and newspapers Pre-recorded radio messages with contact information highlighting the importance of continuity of care
are transmitted by radio stations. Advertisements in local newspapers to inform patients about the
RO clinic status are updated.
Main clinic phone number A backup landline phone number should be available. An automated voicemail message giving
instructions to patients is activated (before any predictable disaster).
Internet presence As per Table 1, patients and staff should have various alternatives to find the status of the clinic and
contact information.
Satellite phone Satellite phone is activated (before any predictable disaster).
Abbreviations: EOC Z emergency operations coordinator; HIPAA Z Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996; PCOC Z
prepare, communicate, operate, compensate; RO Z radiation oncology.
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Table 3 Compensate: Step 4 of PCOC, assuming a 2-3 week delay in radiation therapy





Low Restart therapy when possible. Given that these are usually patients
with concern for microscopic disease who have already received (or
are receiving) chemotherapy, the impact of a treatment break and




High Restart these patients sooner than the postoperative patients.
Concurrent chemotherapy group: Recommend restarting with
standard fractionation. If the patient has a prolonged delay, consider
adding a cycle of chemotherapy at a systemic dose during the
treatment break.
RT alone group: RT-alone group (or sequential chemoRT group).
Consider modest hypofractionation of no more than 2.53 Gy per
fraction to a total dose of 63.25 Gy without chemotherapy and no
highly conformal treatment techniques.27 For highly conformal
image guided/intensity modulated RT techniques, consider 60 Gy in
15 fractions without chemotherapy.28 Consider these schedules
especially for larger or more aggressive tumors.
SCLC Limited stage Very high Restart thoracic as soon as possible (even midcycle) and preferentially
switch to twice a day per Turrisi.29 Consider following curative
chemoradiation regimens of 40 Gy in 15 fractions,30 40 Gy in 16
fractions,31 or 42 Gy in 15 fractions,32 or 39.9 Gy in 15 fractions.33
The potential advantage of these schedules is that the dose
constraints are usually easily met (cord <36 Gy; V18<37%). A
patient who had a few fractions followed by a long break often can
safely receive this schedule upon restart with an acceptable
composite plan.
Extensive stage Very high If the delay caused deferment of prophylactic cranial irradiation or
consolidative thoracic RT, decide on a case-by-case basis.
Head and neck 1 wk (w10 Gy) of RT,
followed by a 2-3 wk
break or longer
High The tumor impact of the initial 10 Gy is essentially lost. Deliver the
full prescription dose of 60-70 Gy without reduction once the
patient is able to resume therapy.21





High Consider accelerated and/or hyperfractionated schedules to try and





the order of months)
Very High Surgical salvage. If not feasible, consider full-dose reirradiation
despite the known higher risk for late-normal tissue toxicity. In this
challenging situation, only treating the gross disease while avoiding
elective regions is warranted.21
Uterine cervix Definitive High Consider adding approximately 5 Gy per wk with 3-dimensional
image-based brachytherapy for each week of radiation duration
beyond 7 weeks, respecting the organ-at-risk tolerance doses. This
must be carefully weighed against the doses that the organs at risk
will receive by adding this extra dose to the tumor.34 For a 2-3 week
interruption, strive for a minimum of 50.4 Gy instead of 45 Gy to
the pelvis. Do not recommend twice a day or other altered schedule
(weekend or otherwise). Do not discount any previously given dose.
The use of LDR instead of HDR brachytherapy would eliminate any
need for electricity. If HDR is available only, the physician can
admit the patient to the hospital and administer multiple sequential
HDR treatments up to twice a day to complete the therapy in a
shorter period of time. Use of 4 fractions of 700 cGy rather than 5
fractions of 500-600 cGy can also be considered. Starting the
(continued on next page)
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patients to leave a message to assist with follow up; this
can be as simple as a clipboard left at the front door for
patients to leave their name, the current date, and the best
means of contact. Please refer to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act considerations in
Table 2.
Operate: Step 3 of PCOC
In the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, patients faced
multiple challenges and priorities that shifted from RT to
survival. Automated teller machines and credit cards did
not work without power, and the economy revolved
around cash. Those who did not have cash on hand when
the hurricane made landfall had to go to banks once banks
resumed operations to withdraw money, which was
initially available only in limited quantities. Without
electricity, gas pumps did not work, and the refueling of
gas stations was challenging because of road conditions.
Diabetic patients could not refrigerate their insulin. Su-
permarkets faced shortages, and food spoiled from lack of
refrigeration. Those most affected by flooding or struc-
tural damage to their homes relocated to designated
government shelters, mainly public schools. Landslides,
washed-out roads and bridges, downed trees and electric
poles, debris, flooding, unpowered traffic lights,
decreased gasoline availability that caused long lines, lack
Table 3 (continued )
Cancer Clinical scenario Impact
of gap
Recommendations
brachytherapy during the course of external beam is feasible,35 but
external beam should not be given on the same day as
brachytherapy. No treatment break should be given between
external beam and brachytherapy.
B Postoperative Moderate Consider adjuvant vaginal cylinder brachytherapy.
Breast Breast-only treatment Low Do not change the whole-breast dose in the setting of a treatment
break (continue the original 42.56 Gy in 16 fractions or 50 Gy in 25
fractions). The boost portion of the treatment dose gets adjusted as
follows:
 Initial treatment plan did not include a sequential boost to the
lumpectomy cavity PTV: 10 Gy in 5 fractions boost.
 Initial treatment plan included a sequential boost to the lumpectomy
cavity PTV: Add one 2 Gy fraction per week missed up to 66 Gy;
alternatively, a 2.3 Gy  5 boost. If the intended boost was to 66
Gy, increase the dose up to 70 Gy, and consider reducing the
volume to the highest risk region.
Chest wall after
mastectomy






with breast or chest
wall
Low Dose is adjusted to a maximum of 50 Gy in 2 Gy fractions.
Prostate Very low For treatment delays <1 wk, no need for corrective action. ADT may
safely mitigate delays up to 2 weeks. For patients receiving RT
alone for whom a long break is anticipated, consider starting ADT.
For patients not undergoing ADT, 1-2 conventional fractions may
compensate for a 1-wk break if normal tissue tolerance allows.
Accelerating treatment to 6 fractions per wk (1 twice-daily treatment
per wk) or switching to a moderately hypofractionated course may
help compensate for treatment gaps.23 When hypofractionating,
maintain an equal or slightly higher EQD2 for the tumor using an a/
b ratio of 1.5 without exceeding the EQD2 of normal tissues using
an a/b ratio of 3.
Abbreviations: ADT Z androgen deprivation therapy; EQD2Z equivalent dose in 2 Gy; HDR Z high dose rate; LDR Z low dose rate; NSCLCZ
non-small cell lung cancer; PCOC Z Prepare, Communicate, Operate, Compensate; PTVZ planning target volume; RT Z radiation therapy; SCLC
Z small cell lung cancer.
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of communication, and limited supplies of water and food
hindered many patients and staff from returning to RO
clinics. The damage to vehicles and transportation routes,
the difficulty in obtaining fuel, and the displacement of
refugees were significant obstacles for patients in
resuming RT. Obtaining bottled water and the restoration
of water utility services were significant problems during
the recovery process. Both Puerto Rico’s situation as an
island separated from the mainland and its mountainous
central territory greatly hindered recovery efforts amid the
widespread devastation. The preparations of RO clinics
before Maria’s landfall were grossly insufficient given the
scale of the catastrophe. These shortcomings were acutely
experienced and have motivated their enumeration in this
publication.
Initially little was known of the operational status of
RO clinics in Puerto Rico. The lack of communication
and limited online information on how to contact each
clinic posed a great challenge. Through a slow process of
trial and error, 18 RO clinics were identified: 10 in the
North, 3 in the West, 2 in the East, 2 in the South, and 1 in
the Central Region. Identification of these clinics was
hindered by a lack of communication with the island and
absent or outdated information in the American Society
for Radiation Oncology (ASTRO) directory, Google,
Facebook, and web pages. Of the 7 RO clinics reachable
after landfall, 5 were treating between 20% and 50% of
their previous census, which was very concerning. A
Google map was created to identify which clinics were
operational, inoperative, or had an unknown status
(available at https://drive.google.com/open?idZ1UHPK7
cUIeSmjcCd_LtRm6hLEc58&uspZsharing) and was
available to anyone through Facebook and the ASTRO
website. Another Google map was subsequently created
to show which clinics has access to electricity (available
at: https://drive.google.com/open?idZ1ztCUUiKtp9kRf
skZ4KvJcvcEoRU&uspZsharing). A third Google map
was made to show centers in the U.S. mainland that had
expressed interest in treating Puerto Rican patients
(available at: https://drive.google.com/open?idZ17
lM0vxENRzL31kI4CufwiyT-HJs&uspZsharing). The
last 2 links were available to radiation oncologists in
Puerto Rico and ASTRO officials helping with the relief
efforts. Some of the centers were identified with the help
of private practitioners who reached out to ASTRO,
ASTRO experts working on treatment interruption rec-
ommendations and who volunteered at their academic
institutions, and RO clinics in the mainland to which ra-
diation oncologists in Puerto Rico had reached out. Pa-
tients with cancer should be given priority for plane
tickets if no local treatment alternatives are available.
A Facebook group called Radioterapia Puerto Rico
Huracan Maria (Radiotherapy Puerto Rico Hurricane
Maria, https://www.facebook.com/groups/147617797579
5089/) was created to provide details on the condition
of each clinic and alternate contact methods, including
staff phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and clinic phone
numbers (many of which were initially unreachable).
Staff from the various facilities were encouraged to post
any updates on their clinic, essentially creating a bulletin
board, but participation was poor. Messages encouraging
patients to return to RT treatments were posted in several
Facebook groups covering Hurricane Maria both in
Spanish and English. Groups were selected based on
number of members to have the largest impact. Similar
messages were sent to local radio stations by local RO
clinics and ASTRO.
ASTRO recorded public messages to run in areas in
the U.S. mainland with large Puerto Rican populations. In
addition, ASTRO posted the status of RO facilities in
Puerto Rico at http://www.rtanswers.org and gave links to
Spanish and English audio for public radio announce-
ments. Overall, online initiatives and radio messages in
the U.S. mainland were mainly effective in informing
relatives or friends of RT patients in Puerto Rico and
giving ASTRO, Congress, and other government agencies
a better picture of the status and needs of the RO clinics,
as well as generating a comprehensive list of clinics in
need of diesel supplies to forward to relevant agencies.
Local efforts to contact patients by the individual clinics
in Puerto Rico and local radio messages had the most
impact in reaching out to patients. The clinic in the
hardest hit area went as far as going door to door to find
patients and was successful in finding all but 1 patient,
who was no longer home. If feasible and safe, this strat-
egy can be highly effective early after a disaster.
Transportation was a major challenge for patients.
Long lines of up to 12 hours were initially necessary to
get fuel after many lined up at the break of dawn. Initially,
only $20 of gasoline could be purchased, which made the
situation more critical. This improved approximately
2 weeks after the curfew was suspended. The curfew
initially began at 6 PM and later at 12 AM, assisting the
unrestricted purchase of gasoline by providing increased
access to pumps (Gil B., Personal communication, 2018).
The American Cancer Society (ACS) coordinated trans-
portation to many patients who could not reach their RO
centers through collaboration with a commercial trans-
portation partner.
Military aircraft were used to transfer patients from
local hospitals to the USNS Comfort, a hospital ship that
was anchored in San Juan and Ceiba after the Federal
Patient Movement was activated.14 The military subse-
quently transported supplies to various municipalities in
Puerto Rico and was involved in the repair of bridges and
the Guajataca Lake Dam, which was threatening collapse.
The transfer of patients to the U.S. mainland was mostly
done thanks to many private planes from humanitarian aid
that returned with passengers who were transported free
of charge. Because of the destruction of a key generator
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used by the Federal Aviation Administration to power its
control center and damage to communication infrastruc-
ture, managing air traffic was very difficult and required
visual and physical spacing.15
Despite most RO clinics having theoretical access to
power from diesel generators, some dependent on diesel
generators from adjacent hospitals were not prioritized
and remained without power. FEMA helped supply diesel
to some RO clinics that were part of hospital systems.
However, independent facilities in need of diesel did not
receive it, and this was a significant shortcoming in pa-
tient care.
Humacao was hit hard by Hurricane Maria because of
its proximity to Yabucoa, where Hurricane Maria entered
Puerto Rico. The RO clinic in Humacao was continuously
dependent on a diesel generator for 140 days (until
February 7, 2018) with only 30-minute breaks for oil and
filter changes. Continuous operation, including during the
night, was necessary because air conditioning is necessary
to maintain the correct temperature and humidity for the
linear accelerator, CT scan, uninterruptible power supply,
and servers. Early after Maria’s landfall approximately
2500 gallons of diesel were stolen from the RO clinic in
Humacao. FEMA helped provide diesel from October
2017 to the first week of January 2018, and measures
taken to prevent the repeated theft of diesel included a
private security guard, reinforced chains and locks, and a
custom-made security encasement for the diesel tank.
This last measure was only accomplished after a 2-month
search for a craftsman to build the encasement.
Initially, staff went to each patient’s house to ensure
patients resumed treatment, and half of the staff’s salary
was paid in cash to compensate for inoperative automated
teller machines and credit cards. Early in 2018 they were
treating half of their average census because major hos-
pitals in Humacao had only recently been connected to
the power grid and were recovering. During this period,
local surgeons temporarily relocated to San Juan and
Caguas hospitals, resulting in RO referrals going to those
areas. No payments had been received from insurance
companies to reimburse for repairs or business
interruption.
The Caribbean Imaging and Radiation Treatment
Center (CIRT) has clinics in Ponce and Yauco, Puerto
Rico. CIRT Ponce is considered the main center, and
CIRT Yauco is a satellite clinic that connects remotely to
servers located at the Ponce center. Because of damage to
the communications infrastructure in the south of the is-
land, the Yauco center was not able to restart operations
until 5 to 6 weeks after Hurricane Maria. Connection to
the remote servers was not re-established until the first
week of November 2017. In an effort to mitigate treat-
ment delays, all patients from the Yauco clinic were re-
evaluated and resimulated before radiation treatment
plans were redone at the Ponce center. Per the ASTRO
recommendations, changes to treatment sequencing and
total dose were implemented. Most patients were treated
on a 6 fraction per week schedule. All patients were able
to complete treatment.
The financial pressures RO clinics face after such a
disaster are worth mentioning. The cost of RO equipment
in Puerto Rico is similar to that in the U.S. mainland, but
reimbursement is significantly lower. For example, the
reimbursement for an IMRT prostate, IMRT standard, or
IMRT head and neck definitive RT course in Puerto Rico
is approximately $16,000, $10,500, and $14,500,
respectively; in the U.S. mainland, the corresponding
reimbursement would be $19,500 (þ22%), $13,500
(þ29%), and $20,000 (þ38%), respectively.16
Expenditures increased dramatically after the disaster
because of diesel fuel costs; facility repairs; and equip-
ment maintenance, repair, and replacement from water
damage, flooding, and power surges. In addition, income
decreased dramatically because some patients ultimately
discontinued treatment or resumed treatment abroad or at
another local clinic where the standard of living, trans-
portation, and/or social support might be better. Mean-
while, reimbursement from health insurance companies
was delayed because of disruption on the billing and
business side. Ultimately, because RO is a referral-
dependent specialty, disruption in hospital and physician
communication and diagnostic services can dramatically
reduce the influx of new patients. Consequently, some
facilities may find it challenging to meet their financial
obligations. Clinics may be reluctant to share their prob-
lems out of fear of losing more business.
RT abroad may not be a realistic option for most pa-
tients unless they are treated as medical refugees with
considerations given to airfare, food, housing, trans-
portation, social support, Spanish translators, and the
improbability of reimbursement depending on the specific
insurance. RT costs may be easier to absorb, but
chemotherapy costs may be more challenging and may
require coordination at a higher institutional level.
Approximately 44.4% of patients in Puerto Rico are
poor,17 have many social problems, and only have
government-subsidized, very limited health insurance
coverage. In 2017, the health insurance distribution was
as follows: employer (23%), non-group (9%), Medicaid
(47%), Medicare (14%), other public (1%), and uninsured
(7%).18,19 The Medicare Advantage health maintenance
program plans only cover care in certain hospitals on the
island. Most Medicare patients are economically con-
strained and may have significant cultural challenges
when traveling to the U.S. mainland. In addition, most are
elderly, have significant comorbidities, and rely on care-
givers to help with activities of daily living.
Nevertheless, treatment abroad may temporarily
relieve patients from housing, food, water, electricity,
transportation, and other social problems and allow the
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patient to focus on the arduous cancer treatment. For
patients with family abroad who have some understanding
of English and better health insurance and economic re-
sources, travel is more feasible.
Having a clear understanding of when a local facility
may become operational again is critical. For example, a
patient with prostate cancer might be better served waiting
a few days or weeks, aided by androgen deprivation
therapy, before resuming treatment locally rather than
waiting for a longer period of time to get a flight before
encountering further delays from a second consultation,
simulation, and treatment planning, potentially with
incomplete local medical records. A patient with head and
neck cancer, for whom time is critical and who has no
realistic local option in the foreseeable future, may be
better served seeking treatment abroad, depending on the
situation.
Health insurance region restrictions affected patients
all over the island. A formal statement from the Puerto
Rico Insurance Commissioner Office was issued on
September 28, 2017 with regard to preauthorizations,
referrals, and claims of insured providers and subscribers,
which established that organizations that provide health
insurance plans should suspend preauthorization and
referral requirements, not cancel policies for lack of
payment, and provide other necessary accommodations
for the emergency.20 This order allowed patients to seek
medical attention outside of their health care insurance
region and to access specialists outside their coverage
network. The order was in effect until March 15, 2018,
with the exception of some insurers that were operating at
full capacity before that date. This facilitated and expe-
dited the delivery of RT treatments.
Finally, work and life balance during a time of crisis is
worth mentioning. In emergency situations, emotional
fatigue is as debilitating as physical exhaustion. The
compassion and altruism of medical personnel are not
inexhaustible, and substantial efforts must be made to
support them during and after a crisis. The following are
some accounts from RO clinics in Puerto Rico.
Narrative 1
“It was very difficult to balance the crisis in our homes:
without water and without power, in my case for 40 days,
the long lines at the very few gas stations open, lack of
groceries in supermarkets, rationing of bottled water, and
many other things that I do not even want to remember.
Because of the crisis, one did things automatically. If you
thought about it a lot you would fall into depression. In
addition, we spent a lot of time without receiving payment
from medical plans and the little money we had was used
for major repairs and payroll. As of today, the insurance
has not paid us a penny for the substantial material losses
and damages to the equipment.”
Narrative 2
“Like many Puerto Ricans, my personal life was
significantly disrupted before Maria’s landfall. The power
to my home, my elderly parents’ home, my children’s
school andmany traffic lights inmy area were still out since
Hurricane Irma’s strike two weeks earlier. During those
weeks, traffic jams and fierce competition for fuel to run
emergency power generators were the order of the day.
Other than minor water damage, our property was
mostly spared by Maria. Many Puerto Ricans, especially
the socioeconomically vulnerable, were not as lucky. In
Maria’s aftermath, the aforementioned difficulties wors-
ened exponentially, the salubrity of food became suspect
and there was an overall scarcity of ordinary supplies.
Although initially overwhelming, the situation brought
family and neighbors together. It actually brought the
Island together and the rest of the United States closer. It
made many of us reflect on how much of the ordinary
things in our lives are not necessary and the immense
satisfaction of helping in different ways.
Once my family was safe and provided for, concen-
trating on getting patients back on treatment helped me
not to dwell on the Island’s difficulties for which I
couldn’t significantly contribute. Things began to
improve markedly 4 months later when we were finally
reconnected to the power grid. Reaching our previous
normalcy took significant effort, resources, and about a
year. For many, their previous normalcy is a memory they
reminisce of in their new, often weakened, reality.”
Compensate: Step 4 of PCOC
Under the leadership of Brian Kavanagh, MD, ASTRO
president, experts in various disease sites were asked how
to best mitigate the impact of a 2- to 3-week interruption
in treatment. This generated an e-mail discussion among
the disease site experts. The recommendations were
compiled and further refined by all the experts who
participated in the discussion. These are rough guidelines
based on the limited evidence available. Table 3 sum-
marizes the recommendations from the ASTRO panel of
experts for lung, head and neck, uterine cervix, breast, and
prostate cancer. Before this publication, a special edition
of the International Journal of Radiation Oncology 
Biology  Physics focused on Radiation Therapy in Times
of Disaster and addressed RT treatment interruptions in
head and neck,21 lung,22 and prostate23 cancer. Table 3
makes reference to the previous head and neck and
prostate recommendations and provides new concrete
recommendations for managing lung RT interruptions.
One radiation oncologist in Puerto Rico mentioned that
the “majority of our patients gladly accepted changes in
their treatment plan to compensate for treatment
interruptions.”
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Conclusions
Natural disasters such as Hurricane Maria highlight the
importance of emergency preparedness. Every RO clinic
should have a robust emergency operations plan to
minimize the impact of RT interruptions to patients. We
hope that the recommended preparations and practices in
this paper will serve as a starting point from which to
further refine and disseminate strategies and mitigate
future disasters in any location. Organizations such as
ASTRO, the European Society for Radiotherapy and
Oncology, the Sino-American Network for Therapeutic
Radiology and Oncology, the Latin American Association
of Radiation Oncology, the Japanese Society for Radia-
tion Oncology, the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the American Association of Physicists in Medicine, and
many others representing our field should collaborate and
further develop and refine these guidelines to better suit
regional needs.
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